Surveys of Recent Developments in New Jersey Law
In this survey section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents surveys of recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, the Law Review
hopes to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of interestingchanges
in significant areas of practice.
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DUTY OF LOYALTY -

MOONLIGHTING - EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE TO
AN EMPLOYER'S
COMPETITOR,
INCLUDING
FORMATION
OF A
COMPETING BUSINESS, MAY BREACH THE EMPLOYEE'S DuTy OF
LOYALTY AND REQUIRE FORFEITURE OF COMPENSATION PAID TO THE
EMPLOYEE DURING PERIODS OF DISLOYALTY Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke,

157 N.J. 504, 724 A.2d 783 (1999).
From March 1984 until January 1993, Donald Gedicke was an atwill employee of Cameco, Inc. (Cameco), a manufacturer of various
food products. See Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 157 N.J. 504, 510, 724 A.2d
783, 786 (1999).
In his position as Cameco's traffic manager,
Gedicke had primary responsibility to arrange for common carriers
to transport the company's food products to several retail stores.
This required Gedicke to coordinate shipping schedules, negotiate
shipping rates, and supervise warehouse personnel. Along with
overseeing all aspects of the shipping process, Gedicke's position also
required him to inspect Cameco's off-site warehouses. See id. at 511,
724 A.2d at 786. As a result of his position, Gedicke acquired
information that Cameco considered confidential, including the
names of customers, common carriers, suppliers, and the details of
Cameco's delivery routes and rates.
In 1990, Gedicke and his wife, Priscilla Mueller formed Newton
Transportation Service (Newton) without informing Cameco.
Working primarily out of their home, Gedicke and Mueller
coordinated the shipping of food products to retailers on behalf of
both distributors and truckers. While transacting business for
Newton, Gedicke relied on general knowledge that he had acquired
through his experiences with Cameco and from prior employers. See
id. at 512, 724 A.2d at 787. Newton's profits ranged from $2536 in
1990 to $62,090 in 1993. See id. at 511, 724 A.2d at 786. Two of the
distributors with whom Newton transacted business, Atalanta
Corporation (Atalanta) and Kohler Delicatessen Meats (Kohler),
distributed the same food products as Cameco.
While operating Newton and simultaneously working in
Cameco's employ, Gedicke often arranged to have the shipments to
the customers of both Cameco and Newton transported on the same
truck. According to Gedicke, such commingled shipments are
routine and continued to occur even after the termination of his
673
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employment with Cameco. This practice actually benefited Cameco
by lowering the company's shipping rates. See id. at 511-12, 724 A.2d
at 786. During many of these shipments, the supplies to Newton's
customers were delivered before those of Cameco. See id. at 512, 724
A.2d at 786. Gedicke claimed that this was done for practical reasons
and that Cameco was not prejudiced by the activity.
Although she relied on Gedicke's in-depth knowledge of
shipping practices, Mueller held primary responsibility for
transacting Newton's business. See id., 724 A.2d at 787. The bulk of
Gedicke's participation occurred in the evenings and on weekends.
Gedicke occasionally would make phone calls on Newton's behalf
during Cameco working hours, although these activities accounted
for no more than fifteen minutes per day.
In January 1993, Cameco fired Gedicke for poor job
performance. According.to Cameco's presidentJerry Perl, Gedicke's
termination resulted specifically from his failure to inspect off-site
warehouses, his failure to negotiate lower shipping rates, and his
authorization of excessive overtime within his department. See id. at
513, 724 A.2d at 787. Following his termination, Gedicke entered
into a noncompete agreement with Cameco in order to receive the
money that he had contributed to Cameco's pension fund. See id. at
510, 724 A.2d at 786. After Gedicke's termination, Cameco learned
of his involvement with Newton.
Cameco filed suit against Gedicke, alleging unjust enrichment,
conversion, tortious interference with contractual rights, tortious
interference with economic advantage, and breach of the duty of
loyalty. The trial court heard testimony from all of the critical
witnesses, including Gedicke, Mueller, Perl, and Scott Maier, a
certified public accountant whom Cameco tendered as an expert. See
id., 724 A.2d at 785.
At the close of the plaintiffs case, the New Jersey Superior
Court, Law Division, dismissed the complaint. See id. at 509, 724 A.2d
at 785. The law division concluded that Gedicke's testimony was
credible, while Perl's "was 'exaggerated' and motivated by
'vindictiveness."' Id. at 513, 724 A.2d at 787. The law division found
that Gedicke's conduct had not breached the duty of loyalty owed an
employer, that Gedicke had neither acted on behalf of any party with
interests that conflicted with those of Cameco nor acted
detrimentally to Cameco, that Newton had not directly competed
with Cameco, and that Cameco had suffered no damages as a result
of Gedicke's actions. See id.
Cameco appealed the dismissal of all the claims except for those
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alleging tortious interference with contractual rights and tortious
interference with economic advantage. See id. at 513-14, 724 A.2d at
787. The NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the
law division's dismissal of the claims for unjust enrichment and
conversion. See id. at 514, 724 A.2d at 787. The appellate division,
however, reversed the dismissal of the breach of the duty of loyalty
claim and remanded the case for a new trial. See id. In reaching its
conclusion, the appellate division determined that the trial court's
assessment of witness credibility and weighing of evidence were
reversible error. See id. The appellate division explained that the
trial court should have considered the evidence in the manner most
favorable to the plaintiff and should have given the plaintiff the
benefit of all inferences. See id. Determining that Cameco had
established the prima facie elements for a breach of the duty of
loyalty claim, the appellate division found that an employee's conduct
does not have to constitute direct competition with his employer to
infringe the duty of loyalty. See id. On the contrary, the appellate
division held that mere assistance provided to an employer's
competitor would establish a breach, if the conduct of the employee
was contrary to the interests of his employer. See id. at 514, 724 A.2d
at 787-88. The appellate division also concluded that Cameco had
established the prima facie elements for damages. See id. at 515, 724
A.2d at 788.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Gedicke's petition for
certification. See id. at 509, 724 A.2d at 785. Justice Pollock, writing
for a unanimous court, initially explained that the case required
remand because the court lacked sufficient confidence in the record
to rely on the trial court's assessment of witness credibility. See id. at
516, 724 A.2d at 788. In addition, Justice Pollock noted that
identifying an employee's breach of his duty of loyalty and
determining the appropriate remedy for such breach are factual
questions that depend upon various factors. See id. Justice Pollock
further announced that an employer may demonstrate a prima facie
case for breach of that duty by proving that a salaried employee,
without his employer's permission, established a business that, while
not directly in competition with the employer, may have assisted the
employer's competitors. See id. at 521, 522-23, 724 A.2d at 791, 792.
Justice Pollock began the analysis by examining the appropriate
procedure for granting an involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of a
plaintiffs case when the action is tried without a jury. See id. at 509,
724 A.2d at 785. The justice stated that in nonjury actions the court
must always support its determination with sufficient factual findings.
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See id. (citing Pressler, Current NJ. Court Rules, R. 1:74 cmt. (Gann
1998)). The justice explained that the trial court's factual findings
are subject to more rigorous appellate review when a dismissal is
granted at the close of a plaintiff's case than when it is granted at the
conclusion of the entire action. See id. When a complaint is
dismissed at the close of plaintiffs case, the court elaborated, the
appellate court must accept both the veracity of the plaintiffs
evidence and any legitimate inference drawn therefrom. See id.
(citing Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:37-2(b) (Gann 1998)).
In contrast, the court articulated that if factual findings are made at
the conclusion of the entire action, the reviewing court must accept
those findings, provided that they are supported by the evidence. See
id. (citing Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, R. 2:10-1 (Gann 1998)).
Because dismissal was granted at the close of Cameco's case, Justice
Pollock stated that the trial court's "general factual findings" are
subject to a more stringent review, despite the fact that all the critical
witnesses had testified. See id. at 510, 724 A.2d at 785.
Justice Pollock next addressed the propriety of the trial court's
examination of witness credibility. See id. at 515-16, 724 A.2d at 788.
The justice, while not questioning the accuracy of the lower court's
conclusions, firmly pronounced that the trial court should not have
assessed the credibility of the witnesses until after the close of
evidence. See id. at 515, 724 A.2d at 788. The court stressed that the
task of assessing credibility is ordinarily deferred until the close of the
entire action. See id. Only when the testimony is such that no
reasonable person could reasonably disbelieve it, the court
instructed, should the trial court accept a witness's testimony at the
close of a plaintiff s case. See id. Thejustice commented that the trial
court's premature assessment of credibility was understandable
because all the key witnesses had testified. See id. at 515-16, 724 A.2d
at 788. Despite this acknowledgment, Justice Pollock emphasized
that Gedicke had not yet presented his case. See id. at 516, 724 A.2d
at 788. Because of these inadequacies, the justice concluded that the
court did not have enough confidence in the record to accept the
trial court's assessment of witness credibility. See id.
Before addressing the issues relating to the claim of breach of
the duty of loyalty, Justice Pollock cautioned that the lack of adequate
factual findings in this case prohibited a complete analysis of the
dispositive legal principles. See id. In-depth legal analysis, the court
added, was further impeded by the fact-sensitive nature of claims
alleging a breach of an employee's duty of loyalty. See id., 724 A.2d at
788-89. Because employee disloyalty claims arise in various factual
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contexts, the court explained, rigid application of abstract legal
principles is not possible. See id., 724 A.2d at 789.
Despite this forewarning, Justice Pollock stated that certain
principles relating to breach of the duty of loyalty claims have
emerged. See id. First, the justice explained that the scope of the
duty of loyalty varies depending upon the nature of the relationship
between the employee and employer. See id. Employees in a position
of trust and confidence, the court articulated, are subject to a greater
duty than are employees who perform low-level tasks. See id. The
court also recognized that, in today's society, many employees are
forced to seek a secondary source of income due to economic
necessity. See id. at 517, 724 A.2d at 789. Juxtaposed against this
reality of modern life, the court revealed, is the employer's need for
assurances that its interests are not jeopardized when an employee
furthers his own interests or those of a competitor. See id. To avoid
claims of disloyalty, the justice pronounced, an employee planning to
establish an independent business should inform his employer of his
intentions if that business has the possibility of conflicting with the
employer's business interests. See id.
Justice Pollock next examined the significance of the nature of
the employee's conduct in the context of an employee disloyalty
claim. See id. at 517-18, 724 A.2d at 789. The justice explained that
the egregiousness of the employee's conduct is a factor in
determining whether the employee has breached the duty of loyalty
and, if so, in determining the appropriate remedy. See id. at 517, 724
A.2d at 789. The court elaborated that generally no breach occurs if
an employee assists a competitor in only an unintended or indirect
way. See id. On the other hand, the court reasoned that assistance to
a direct competitor, even if slight, could constitute a breach. See id.
The justice emphasized that when there is merely indirect or minimal
competition, an employer may be required to show that an employee
offered the competitor substantial assistance. See id.
Justice Pollock then addressed the possible relief available to an
employer for a breach of the duty of loyalty claim against the
employee. See id. at 518-22, 724 A.2d at 789-91. The justice stated
that a breach of the duty of loyalty, depending upon the facts of the
case, could give rise to either legal or equitable relief. See id. at 518,
724 A.2d at 789. In the instant case, the court noted that Cameco
had requested money damages and equitable relief in the form of the
forfeiture of Gedicke's salary and a disgorgement of Newton's profits.
See id. The court acknowledged that damages could include any
profits that an employee earned while working for the employer, as
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well as compensation for any direct injury suffered as a result of the
breach. See id., 724 A.2d at 789-90. The court cautioned, however,
that an employer would recover money damages only if the employer
could establish that the breach proximately caused the damages. See
id., 724 A.2d at 790. The justice declared that the record did not
indicate that Cameco suffered any money damages as a result of
Gedicke's alleged breach. See id.
Justice Pollock next examined the forfeiture of an employee's
compensation as an additional remedy for breach of the duty of
loyalty. See id. at 519-21, 724 A.2d at 790-91. The justice explained
that the appellate division had already determined that an
employee's wages are not forfeited absent a showing of fraud,
mistake, duress, or an implied or express agreement to the contrary.
See id. at 519, 724 A.2d at 790 (citing Joseph Toker, Inc. v. Cohen, 67 N.J.
Super. 68, 81, 169 A.2d 838, 844 (App. Div. 1961)). In contrast, the
justice also pointed out that the appellate division has articulated that
an employer could recover the compensation paid to an employee
during any period of disloyalty. See id. (citing Simulation Sys. Tech.,
Inc. v. Oldham, 269 N.J. Super. 107, 111-12, 634 A.2d 1034, 1036 (App.
Div. 1993)).
To clarify this ambiguity, Justice Pollock turned to the treatment
of compensation forfeiture in other jurisdictions. See id. at 520, 724
A.2d at 790. The justice noted that both NewYork and Illinois courts
require the forfeiture of all compensation paid during disloyal
periods, with no set-off for properly performed services. See id. (citing
ABC Trans Nat'l Transp., Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders,Inc., 413 N.E.2d
1299, 1315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Maritime Fish Prods., Inc. v. World Wide
Fish Prods., Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 281, 285-87 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)). The
justice then evaluated the law of Massachusetts, which limits recovery
to that portion of compensation that is in excess of the employee's
value to the employer. See id. (citing Walsh v. Atlantic Research Assocs.,
71 N.E.2d 580, 585 (Mass. 1947)). The justice also examined the
Restatement (Second) of Agency (Restatement) and its approach to
the appropriateness of forfeiture of an employee's compensation. See
id. at 520-21, 724 A.2d at 790-91. The justice articulated that, under
the Restatement, an employer is entitled to recover compensation
paid to an employee during any period of disloyalty. See id. at 520,
724 A.2d at 790-91 (discussing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469
(1958)). Furthermore, the justice explained that the Restatement
would not permit the employee to set off the value of his services
against the employer's forfeiture claim if the employee's conduct was
willful, deliberate, or serious. See id. at 520-21, 724 A.2d at 791 (citing

2000]

SURVEYS

679

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469 cmt. b (1958)). Thus, Justice
Pollock instructed that the degree of egregiousness of the employee's
conduct will have a proportional effect on the employer's entitlement
to the forfeiture of wages. See id. at 521, 724 A.2d at 791.
Justice Pollock summarized the analysis of the principles
underlying a claim of breach of an employee's duty of loyalty by
stating that several considerations affect the determination of a
breach and the proper remedy for such a breach. See id. First, the
justice pronounced that the existence of contractual provisions, such
as a noncompete clause or a clause permitting an employee to seek a
second source of income, will affect the analysis. See id. Second, the
justice stated that whether an employer knows of, or has agreed to,
the employee's second source of income is an important
consideration. See id. Third, the justice added that the employee's
status and his relationship with the employer are also to be
considered. See id. The justice explained that corporate officers,
directors, and certain key executives are subject to a higher duty than
are lower-level employees. See id. Finally, the justice imparted that
the nature of the secondary source of income, as well as the conduct
that produced the income effect on the employer, is a meaningful
consideration. See id. at 521-22, 724 A.2d at 792. Elaborating on this
final consideration, the justice stated that employees are generally
prohibited from direct competition with their employers. See id. at
522, 724 A.2d at 791. Justice Pollock added that employees cannot
take advantage of their employers by undertaking clandestine, selfserving activities. See id. The justice warned that an employee who
engages in such activities risks discharge, forfeiture of compensation,
and other equitable and legal liabilities.
See id. Though the
application of these considerations will vary depending on the facts of
each case, the justice instructed that the judicial task in these
situations is to fashion a "fair and reasonable solution in light of the
relevant considerations." Id.
Turning to the facts of the present case, the justice posited that,
if the lower court determines that Gedicke breached the duty of
loyalty, two remedies are possible: forfeiture of a portion of his
compensation or disgorgement of a portion of Newton's profits. See
id. Justice Pollock reasoned that a partial forfeiture would be more
appropriate because Gedicke did not directly compete with Cameco,
only marginally aided Cameco's competitors, and did not intend to
injure Cameco's business. See id., 724 A.2d at 791-92. The court
further hypothesized that limiting Cameco's recovery to that portion
of Gedicke's salary that was paid to him for times when he was
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advancing Newton's interests might be appropriate in light of the fact
that Newton's profits were modest and that Gedicke spent a minimal
amount of Cameco's business time attending to Newton's affairs. See
id., 724 A.2d at 792.
The court again stressed, however, that the inadequacy of the
record precluded a more probing analysis of Cameco's right to
recover. See id. Nevertheless, the court did identify several facts that
supported a recovery by Cameco, including Gedicke's failure to
inform Cameco of his activities, spending Cameco work hours
conducting Newton's business, and assisting Cameco's competitors.
See id. at 522-23, 724 A.2d at 792. Conversely, the justice also noted
that several facts suggested that Gedicke did not breach his duty. See
id. at 523, 724 A.2d at 792. Justice Pollock noted that Gedicke was a
low-level employee, was not subject to contractual provisions
preventing him from establishing a business, did not cause his
employer to lose business, and did not compete directly with Cameco
or provide Cameco's competitors with substantial assistance. See id.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
court held that Cameco had established enough evidence to survive
Gedicke's motion to dismiss. See id. Despite this holding, the justice
commented that the trial court ultimately could still find that
Gedicke's assistance was insubstantial, that Cameco's competition
with Atalanta and Kohler was inconsequential, or that Gedicke did
not act adversely to Cameco, thus precluding recovery. See id.
The NewJersey Supreme Court's analysis does little to clarify the
type of assistance to a competitor that will establish a breach of an
employee's duty of loyalty. Initially, Justice Pollock thoroughly
addresses the procedural issues relevant in the case. The justice
clearly articulates his reasons for concluding that a trial court should
consider witness credibility at the close of a plaintiffs case only under
the most extraordinary circumstances. As the justice turns the court's
attention toward the substantive legal issues of the case, however, the
analysis becomes much less clear.
At the outset, the justice forewarns that an incomplete trial court
record and the fact-sensitive nature of employee disloyalty claims
precludes a detailed analysis. See id. at 516, 724 A.2d at 788-89.
Perhaps because of these limitations, the court seems more inclined
simply to set out general principles regarding employee disloyalty
rather than to establish specific rules applicable to the circumstances
at issue. The result of the incomplete lower court record is that the
NewJersey Supreme Court provides no clear definition of the type of
assistance to a competitor that will breach an employee's duty of
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loyalty.
Instead of fashioning concrete guidelines for determining the
relief available in an employee disloyalty case, the court states simply
that the egregiousness of an employee's conduct might affect the
appropriate remedy. Even when setting out a list of considerations
relevant to the determination of a breach, the court undercuts their
usefulness with the qualifying statement that the extent of the
considerations' relevance varies depending upon the case. If this
generalized discussion was required due to the inadequacies of the
lower court's record, perhaps the court should have waited to address
these issues until it was presented with a more factually developed
case.
John A. Boyle

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
-

YOUTH-BASED TERMINATION
AN EMPLOYEE AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM BASED ON YOUTH IS

COGNIZABLE UNDER THE NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
AND APPROPRIATELY EVALUATED UNDER A HEIGHTENED REVERSEDISCRIMINATION STANDARD Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157

N.J. 188, 723 A.2d 944 (1999).
On January 21, 1994, officials of Bergen Commercial Bank
(Bergen Bank) discharged twenty-five-year-old respondent Michael
Sisler from his position as vice president of credit-card operations.
See Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 197, 723 A.2d 944,
948 (1999). Earlier in 1993, Bergen Bank officials actively recruited
Sisler and offered him an annual salary of $70,000. See id. at 196, 723
A.2d at 948. Prior to his start date of September 1, 1993, Sisler was
asked about his age at a luncheon meeting with Bergen Bank's
chairman and co-founder, Tom Bruno. Sisler replied that he was
twenty-five years old. This allegedly shocked Bruno, who then
requested that Sisler not mention his age to others due to the
embarrassment that could result from co-workers knowing his age in
relation to his duties and salary. See id. at 196-97, 723 A.2d at 948.
After eight days in Bergen Bank's employ, Sisler was told by his
superiors that "they didn't think this was going to work," that a
change in his position was possible, and that he might be discharged.
Id. at 197, 723 A.2d at 948. Skeptical of their reasons for suggesting a
change in his status after such a brief period of employment, Sisler
refused an alternative position and maintained his vice presidency.
Sisler was terminated approximately five months later by his
superiors, who cited no specific concerns other than that it was not
working out. Subsequently, Bergen Bank hired a thirty-one-year-old
vice president to replace Sisler.
A fruitless attempt at settlement was a precursor to Sisler's
attorney notifying Bergen Bank of an impending age discrimination
lawsuit. See id. Prior to Sisler's attorney's official filing of a claim,
Bergen Bank preemptively brought claims of conversion, breach of
duty, intentional interference, and trespass against the former vice
president. See id. Sisler answered and counterclaimed, alleging age
discrimination pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (LAD), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5 (West 1993), and breach
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of contract. See id. at 198, 723 A.2d at 948. The New Jersey Superior
Court, Law Division, held that the Legislature intended for the scope
of age discrimination protection to pertain only to workers over forty
years old and, therefore, granted Bergen Bank's motion for partial
summary judgment on the LAD counterclaim. See id All remaining
claims were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, allowing Sisler to
appeal the trial court's determination of LAD's protected age class.
See id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the
trial court's ruling and construed the pertinent LAD provisions to
forbid age discrimination against any worker, regardless of age. See
id., 723 A.2d at 948-49. Furthermore, the appellate division noted
that Sisler's claim of discrimination based on youth, as opposed to
old age, should be assessed according to the "reverse-discrimination"
framework fashioned in Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J.
539, 569 A.2d 793 (1990). See id., 723 A.2d at 949.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification, affirmed
the judgment of the appellate division, and remanded the matter for
further proceedings. See id. at 221, 723 A.2d at 960. The court held
that an employee age discrimination claim based on youth is
cognizable under LAD and should be evaluated under a heightened
"reverse-discrimination" standard. See id. at 217, 723 A.2d at 958.
The court also overruled Burke v. Township of Franklin, 261 N.J. Super.
592, 619 A.2d 643 (App. Div. 1993), to the extent that it contradicted
the court's expansive interpretation of LAD's protected age class. See
id. at 215, 723 A.2d at 957. The court noted that a successful age
discrimination claim based on youth demands a showing that the
plaintiff was discharged notwithstanding satisfactory performance.
See id. at 218, 723 A.2d at 959. Furthermore, the court explained that
the claim must also show that termination was due to an employer's
discrimination against the employee's age class, as evidenced by the
hiring of an older replacement. See id.
Justice Stein, writing for a unanimous court, acknowledged that
the issue of invoking LAD for wrongful termination based on youth
was one of first impression. See id. at 196, 723 A.2d at 947. The
justice first reviewed LAD's amended age discrimination sections,
10:5-4 and 10:5-12(a), which included the general word "age" instead
of a particular age range. See id. at 199-200, 723 A.2d at 949. The
justice stated that whether these provisions protect solely older
workers is a matter of interpretation of the plain wording and
underlying purpose of the statute. See id. at 200, 723 A.2d at 949.
Recognizing that both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and

684

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 30:682

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) have provisions
considered analogous and useful to LAD interpretation, the court
noted that the appellate division distinguished the ADEA with respect
to its explicit limitation of protection to individuals who are at least
forty years of age. See id. at 201, 723 A.2d at 950 (citing 29 U.S.C. §
623(a) (1998)). The justice declared that despite many similarities
between LAD and the ADEA, the existence of the explicit age
limitation contained in the ADEA is a substantive difference that
necessitates a different analysis when interpreting LAD. See id. at 20102, 723 A.2d at 950.
Justice Stein next addressed Sisler's contention that the statutory
language of "all persons" constitutes a facially nonrestrictive and
unambiguous assertion of protection, regardless of age. See id. at 202,
723 A.2d at 950. Declining to follow Sisler's characterization of the
statute's wording, the justice posited that the conflicting
interpretations from the lower courts reflect an ambiguity in LAD's
scope. See id., 723 A.2d at 951. The court also turned to other
jurisdictions and noted a similar disagreement regarding the extent
to which younger workers are covered by age discrimination laws. See
id. The justice described the spectrum of thought represented by the
courts of Washington and Oregon, respectively, as ranging from
policy concerns for narrowly protecting "mature workers," to the
broader goal of preventing stereotypes based on employers' reliance
on age rather than individual capacity. See id. at 203-04, 723 A.2d at
951-52.
Considering additional rules of interpretation, Justice Stein
asserted that courts should refrain from any statutory construction
that would result in any word becoming inoperative, meaningless,
superfluous, or meaning anything other than its traditional
definition. See id. at 204, 723 A.2d at 952. The justice remarked that
reading an "over forty" requirement into LAD's definition section,
10:5-2.1, would render useless the wording that allows employers to
restrict employment of workers under the age of eighteen. See id. at
205, 723 A.2d at 952. In addition, the court considered the
Employment in Public Service Law, noting that the Legislature has
explicitly utilized age restrictions when it intended to limit a
protected class. See id. (discussing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:3-1 (West
1993)).
Acknowledging the differing opinions of the lower courts,
Justice Stein next enumerated "legislative history, legal commentary,
and . . . precedent" as the additional tools upon which the court

should rely for statutory interpretation.

Id.

Agreeing with the
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appellate division's characterization of LAD's legislative history as
limited, the justice turned to Bergen Bank's focus on studies
conducted by the New Jersey Commission on Aging (COA) and the
Old Age Study Commission (OASC). See id. at 205-06, 723 A.2d at
952-53. The court reviewed each of these studies, which addressed
the emerging concerns of older workers who face obstacles associated
with arbitrary age discrimination. See id. The court remarked that
COA had recommended that the Legislature target the age range of
forty-five to sixty-five in prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination. See
id. at 206-07, 723 A.2d at 953. The court further considered COA's
notes on specification of ages, which stressed the need to avoid
interference with laws concerning the employment of minors and
females, the legitimacy of minimum age requirements correlated with
experience, and the unique status of those between forty-five and
sixty-five years of age as opposed to those over the age for mandatory
retirement. See id. Justice Stein concluded this portion of the analysis
by highlighting that the Legislature failed to adopt the explicit age
limitations despite probable reliance on the commissions' findings.
See id. at 207, 723 A.2d at 953.
Justice Stein next addressed the appropriate procedural and
substantive standards by which LAD claims should be assessed. See id.
Noting that the success of a LAD claim depends on a showing that
age influenced and was a determining factor in the termination, the
justice explained that a plaintiff must prove his case by use of either
direct or circumstantial evidence. See id. at 208, 723 A.2d at 954.
With respect to direct evidence, the court described the process of
establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination that
demonstrates a causal relationship between the employer's hostility
toward the employee's age class and the employer's ultimate
decision. See id. The court further noted that after an employee's
proper showing of direct evidence, the burden of production would
shift to the employer. See id. at 209, 723 A.2d at 954. The court
dictated that the employer has the burden to establish that the same
decision would have been made without regard to age. See id.
Referring to the "mixed-motive" analysis, the justice commented that
an employer need not refrain from firing an employee for reasons
that are amorphous or even nonexistent, as long as the reasons are
not unlawful. See id.
Justice Stein next explored a more viable alternative, that of
establishing discriminatory purpose through circumstantial, rather
than direct, evidence. See id. at 209-10, 723 A.2d at 954-55. The
justice focused on the methodology embraced by the United States
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Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted a
modified version of this approach for analyzing LAD claims. See id. at
210, 723 A.2d at 955. The court described the three stages of the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework as including (1) the
employee presenting probative evidence of each element of an age
discrimination claim; (2) the employer rebutting plaintiffs evidence
by setting forth a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision; and (3) the employee responding by proving
that the reason was a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 210-11, 723
A.2d at 955. More specifically, the court enumerated each of the
elements that a plaintiff must prove by the preponderance of the
evidence standard for a cause of action pursuant to LAD: (1)
membership in a protected class; (2) application and eligibility for a
particular employment opening; (3) rejection from that position; and
(4) the employer's continued recruitment of a person with equivalent
qualifications. See id. at 210, 723 A.2d at 955 (citing Erickson v. Marsh
& McLennan Co., 117 N.J. at 539, 550, 569 A.2d 793, 798 (1990)).
Despite the shift in the burden of production, Justice Stein clarified,
the employee always has the burden of persuasion that the
employer's action was a result of intentional discrimination and that
age was a factor in the discharge. See id. at 211, 723 A.2d at 955.
By describing the McDonnell Douglas standard as a case-specific
framework developed in the context of racial discrimination in
employment decisions, Justice Stein remarked that the standard must
undergo modification according to varying circumstances. See id. at
211-12, 723 A.2d at 955-56. Finding that three modifications to the
McDonnell Douglas standard are merited in the context of age
discrimination, the court evaluated circumstances in which elements
for a LAD cause of action are appropriately adjusted. See id. at 212,
723 A.2d at 956. With respect to the third element of a LAD claim,
the court found that an employee could recover for discharge as well
as for failure to hire. See id. Regarding the fourth element of a LAD
claim, the court clarified that the hired replacement need not be
within the protected class, but should have characteristics consistent
with the inferences of discrimination based on age. See id. Finally,
Justice Stein underscored that the court has also allowed a
modification of the first element of a LAD claim, which requires
membership in a protected class. See id. at 214, 723 A.2d at 957.
Regarding a cause of action for reverse discrimination, the court
stated that a showing of background circumstances sufficient to
support the contention that the employer has discriminated against a
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majority class member is adequate for proving the first element of a
LAD claim. See id.
The doctrinal basis thus established, Justice Stein applied the
framework to affirm the appellate division's conclusion that LAD's
prohibition of age discrimination extended to claims based on youth.
See id. at 214-15, 723 A.2d at 957. Given the distinguishing factor of
the ADEA's express age limitation, the court declined to reach its
decision solely by analogy, and noted that its findings were made
pursuant to its interpretation of LAD's plain language and purpose.
See id. at 215, 723 A.2d at 957.
The court determined that the absence of any express age
limitations was indicative of a lack of legislative intent to bar recovery
by younger workers in an age discrimination action pursuant to LAD.
See id. The court asserted that the provision of LAD stating "nothing
in this act ... shall be construed ... to require the employment of
any person under the age of 18" indicated an intent to protect all
employees over eighteen years of age. Id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. §
10:5-2.1 (West 1993)). The court also noted that language allowing
for the existence of an age requirement for apprenticeship
qualification as an exception to prohibition of age discrimination of
workers over eighteen years of age would be superfluous if those
workers were otherwise unprotected. See id. Referring to explicit age
requirements in other state antidiscrimination laws and in
amendments to LAD, the court posited that the Legislature has thus
far not sought to limit the coverage of LAD with respect to claims
based on youth. See id., 723 A.2d at 957-58. Identifying the overall
purpose of anti-discrimination laws as encouraging a personal
assessment of individual aptitude rather than a resort to stereotypes,
the court determined the coverage of a younger class of workers to be
completely consistent with the goals of LAD. See id. at 216, 723 A.2d
at 958. Justice Stein concluded by inviting the Legislature to amend
LAD, should the court's interpretation of its legislative intent be
erroneous. See id.
Addressing the proper standard by which this LAD claim should
be evaluated, Justice Stein declared Sisler's direct evidence
insufficient and, thus, turned to the McDonnell Douglas standard for
circumstantial evidence. See id. at 217, 723 A.2d at 958. Recognizing
that the overriding purpose of age discrimination laws is to protect
older workers, the court affirmed the appellate division's finding that
Sisler, to prevail, must satisfy a "reverse-discrimination" formula. See
id. at 217-18, 723 A-2d at 958-59. The court found that in order to
succeed, Sisler must demonstrate (1) that circumstances rendered
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Bergen Bank's actions suspect with respect to discrimination against a
member of the majority; (2) that he was terminated notwithstanding
that he met the reasonable performance expectations; and (3) that
he was replaced by one whose age permitted an inference of
discrimination based on youth. See id. at 218, 723 A.2d at 959. The
court clarified Sisler's burden with respect to the showing of
circumstances that would permit an inference of discrimination
toward a member of the majority by noting that Sisler need only show
the employer's inclination to discriminate against younger workers.
See id. at 219, 723 A.2d at 959. Without reaching a final disposition
on the matter, the court remarked that the evidence showing a
negative reaction to Sisler's age, and the subsequent request for him
to refrain from telling others of his age, appeared sufficient to
demonstrate the employer's inclination to discriminate against a
member of the majority class. See id.
In conclusion, Justice Stein defended the court's decision in
response to expressed concerns that older workers would be faced
with the barrier of employers being forced to hire young workers for
high-level positions. See id. The justice stressed that this case
presented an exceptional set of circumstances because Bergen Bank
did not appear to object to any other aspects of Sisler's qualifications.
See id. Noting that age is often inextricably connected to other
qualities, such as maturity and judgment, the justice explained that
employers are not restricted from basing employment decisions on
factors that are related to age. See id. at 219-20, 723 A.2d at 959-60.
Rather, the court characterized the implication of its holding as
preventing employment determinations based solely on age. See id. at
220, 723 A.2d at 960. Justice Stein predicted that, given the heavy
burden implicit in the reverse discrimination framework, a young
worker alleging discrimination based on age will rarely prevail. See id.
at 220-21, 723 A.2d at 960.
Age discrimination based on youth echoes the circular dilemma
of a young worker who cannot get a job without experience and
cannot get experience without a job. Youth is often associated with
inexperience. The court's decision, therefore, may be futile to the
extent that an attempt is made to separate age as a forbidden
decision factor from experience or maturity as an acceptable
criterion. Although the court frames today's employment market as
largely youth-oriented, the court laudably recognizes that younger
workers may face discrimination in a manner similar to that which
older workers encounter. The court goes to great lengths to support
its determination that LAD protects young workers against age
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discrimination. Subsequent application of the principles the court
sets forth, however, may indicate that the decision falls short of
providing a viable route to redress.
The theoretical and practical implications of this decision
represent divergent paths. The holding theoretically reflects sound
reasoning that youth is not determinative of one's ability and should
not serve as a basis for adverse employment decisions. The practical
implications of the holding, however, may provide a road map for
employers to circumvent the strictures of LAD.
The court
acknowledged the right of employers to terminate workers based on
concrete and intangible factors, such as experience, level of maturity,
and judgment. See id. at 220, 723 A.2d at 960. The reality of the
situation, perhaps beyond the court's control, is that an employer
need not search too far for an "acceptable" justification for an agebased termination.
The rigorous standard requiring an employee to prove that the
employer's reasoning is a pretext for age discrimination based on
youth appears to be nearly insurmountable. By forbidding age
discrimination based on youth, yet upholding the prohibitively high
standards to which a cause of action must conform, the court may
have simply maintained the status quo. In effect, the court remains
neutral in the ongoing policy debate concerning the protection of
both older workers in a youth-oriented job market and the rights of
younger workers faced with age discrimination.
joy L. Lindo

PUNITIVE DAMAGES - LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION - PUBLIC
ENTITIES MAY BE LIABLE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE LAW
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION BASED ON A FINDING OF UPPER
MANAGEMENT'S ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN, OR INTENTIONAL
UPPER
FURTHER,
CONDUCT;
TO,
EGREGIOUS
INDIFFERENCE
HAVE
EITHER
MANAGEMENT CONSISTS OF THOSE EMPLOYEES WHO
SUPERVISORY AUTHORTY OVER THE OFFENDING EMPLOYEES OR THOSE
EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT THE
Cavuoti v. New
CORPORATION'S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES Jersey Transit Corp., 161 N.J. 107, 735 A.2d 548 (1999).
After working for New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJT) for
approximately eight years, Joseph Cavuoti alleged that he was denied
five different promotions between 1989 and 1993 on account of his
age. See Cavuoti v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 161 N.J. 107, 114, 735 A.2d
548, 552 (1999). The positions for which Cavuoti applied were
Alleging age
subsequently filled by younger candidates.
discrimination, Cavuoti filed an internal grievance with NJT's Equal
Opportunity/Affirmative Action Office (EOAA) and later filed a
similar complaint with the Federal Employment Equal Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).
After these filings, Cavuoti was called into the office of his
superintendent, Deborah Finn. Allegedly, Finn told Cavuoti that
employees should not file grievances alleging discrimination and that
those employees who do so will have problems. In addition, Finn
informed Cavuoti that he must get her permission before contacting
the EOAA again. As a result of Finn's alleged harassment, Cavuoti
regularly complained to Finn's immediate supervisor, Robert Smith.
See id. at 114-15, 735 A.2d at 552. In August of 1996, after giving
Cavuoti two unfavorable annual reviews, Finn and Smith terminated
Cavuoti's employment. See id. at 115, 735 A.2d at 552.
Claiming that NJT violated the Law Against Discrimination
(LAD), NJ. Stat. Ann. § 10:5 (West 1993), Cavuoti filed a complaint
in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division. See id. Cavuoti later
amended his complaint to add a retaliatory discharge claim. See id.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Cavuoti on both the
discrimination and the retaliatory discharge claims. See id., 735 A.2d
Based on these findings, the jury awarded Cavuoti
at 552-53.
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compensatory damages of $222,323 and punitive damages in the
amount of $1,000,000. See id., 735 A.2d at 553.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the
jury verdict, but ordered a new trial on the issue of the punitive
damages award. See id. The appellate division, in finding plain error,
declared that the lower court failed to instruct the jury that punitive
damages may be imposed only when "upper management" actually
participated in, or demonstrated intentional indifference toward, the
discriminatory action. See id. Due to the trial court's omission, the
appellate division concluded that the jury instruction was capable of
creating an unjust result. See id. at 115-16, 735 A.2d at 553.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to
determine whether a public entity may be subjected to the imposition
of punitive damages under LAD and to resolve whether the omission
of the "upper management" jury instruction was capable of creating
an unjust result. See id, at 113, 116, 735 A.2d at 551-52, 553. The
court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the appellate division's
decision and held that a public organization may be liable for
punitive damages under LAD. See id. at 113-14, 735 A.2d at 552. The
court further held that the trial court's omission of the jury
instruction was capable of producing an unjust result because Finn
was not clearly a part of NJT's "upper management." See id. at 113,
735 A.2d at 552. Accordingly, the court remanded the issue of
liability for punitive damages and ordered a new trial with accurate
jury instructions. See id
The New Jersey Supreme Court began its analysis by
determining the basis for a punitive damage award under LAD. See
id. at 116, 735 A.2d at 553. Initially, the court focused on Lehmann v.
Toys 'R' Us, 132 N.J. 587, 625, 626 A.2d 445, 464 (1993), which
established that in order to hold an employer liable for punitive
damages under LAD, "upper management" must actually participate
in or be willfully indifferent toward the discrimination. See id. at 117,
735 A.2d at 554.
Although Lehmann established the "upper
management" requirement, the court recognized that Lehmann did
not set forth a precise standard by which to measure whether an
offending employee is part of an employer's "upper management."
See id. at 117-18, 735 A.2d at 554. Continuing to focus on NewJersey
precedent, the court looked to Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 503, 706
A.2d 685, 691 (1998), which stated that a supervisor has the ultimate
duty to prevent and correct any discriminatory treatment in the
workplace. See id. at 118, 735 A.2d at 554.
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Turning to a recent United States Supreme Court decision on
punitive damages, the court concentrated on Kolstad v. American
Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2129 (1999), in which the Court held
that employers are not liable for a manager's discriminatory
employment decisions when those decisions conflict with the
employer's good-faith efforts to adhere to the law. See i. at 118, 735
A.2d at 554. Drawing a parallel between Lehmann and Kolstad, the
court noted that both standards provide a safeguard for employers
that formulate and actively support antidiscrimination policies. See id,
at 120-21, 735 A.2d at 555-56. Furthermore, the court stated that a
corporation that develops an antidiscrimination policy will likely be
insulated from punitive damages if its efforts include regular
publication of its policies, training seminars for employees regarding
how to eradicate harassment, and implementation of an effective
grievance procedure. See id. at 121, 735 A.2d at 556.
Next, the court defined the standards by which to determine
whether an offender is a member of the defendant employer's
"upper management." See id. at 121-22, 735 A.2d at 556-57. The
court explained that chief operating officers, chief executive officers,
and directors are clearly classified as "upper management," while
assembly line workers without supervisory authority are obviously not.
See id. at 122, 735 A.2d at 557. Recognizing that this standard is factsensitive, the court noted that the standard's goal is to provide
direction for identifying "upper management" between the two
extremes.
See id. The court recognized three public policy
considerations for defining "upper management": (1) the goals of
LAD; (2) the purposes of punitive damage awards; and (3) the need
for a sufficiently broad definition that will be applicable to various
employment forms. See id.
In determining whether an employee has the requisite authority
to be classified as "upper management," the court concentrated on
several factors. See id. at 123, 735 A.2d at 557. Specifically, the court
stated that the focus should be on the employee's position in the
organization's hierarchy, the employee's responsibilities, and the
scope of discretion exercised by the employee. See id. Moreover, the
court concluded that a mere tide of "supervisor" or "manager" is not
beneficial in defining the tiers of "upper management" because
employees with these labels often lack authority to hire, fire,
discipline, or otherwise possess any other responsibility sufficient to
impute the discriminatory actions to the employer. See id. at 123-24,
735 A.2d at 557-58.
Instead, the court found that functional
assignments of the employee are the best way to identify the levels of
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management. See id. at 124, 735 A.2d at 558.
The court next offered suggestions regarding how a trial court
should instruct a jury about the definition of "upper management."
See id. at 128, 735 A.2d at 560. Initially, the court stated that a jury
should be instructed that the goal of the "upper management"
standard is to give employers the incentive to arrange for compliance
programs and to urge the enforcement of such programs. See id.
(citing Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 626, 626 A.2d at 465). Furthermore, the
court concluded that a jury should be instructed that "upper
management" consists of those employees who have either
supervisory authority over the offending employees or who are
responsible for formulating and executing workplace policies. See id.
at 129, 735 A.2d at 561.
Applying the Lehmann principles to the facts of the instant case,
the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that a jury could
conclude that Finn or Smith were regional managers for NJT. See id.
at 131, 735 A.2d at 562. Therefore, the court stressed that the focus
on retrial should be whether Finn or Smith had the authority to
implement NJT's employment practices. See id. Because the issues of
liability for the conduct of Finn and Smith are so intimately
connected with the nature of the wrongful acts, however, the court
held that both the issues of liability and punitive damages must be
retried with properjury instructions. See id.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether LAD permits
the imposition of punitive damages against public entities. See id. at
132, 735 A.2d at 562. The court noted that, in Abbamont v. Piscataway
Township Board of Education, 138 N.J. 405, 433, 650 A.2d 958, 972
(1994), the court held that governmental entities may be liable for
punitive damages under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act
(CEPA). See id. (discussing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19 (West 1988)).
Drawing an analogy to CEPA, the court articulated that the same
reasoning should apply to LAD. See id., 735 A.2d at 563. Thus, the
court adopted the Abbamont reasoning and held that NJT may be
liable for punitive damages under LAD. See id.
After acknowledging policy concerns regarding the imposition
of punitive damages against governmental entities, the court
suggested that such concerns are adequately addressed by the
adoption of the heightened Lehmann standard for imposing punitive
damages. See id. at 133, 735 A.2d at 563. The court maintained that
the failure of the Legislature to specifically exempt public entities
from punitive damage judgments serves as evidence of legislative
acquiescence to the notion that public entities may be liable for
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punitive damages under LAD. See id.
In a partial concurring and partial dissenting opinion, Justice
Pollock, joined by Chief Justice Poritz and Justice Garibaldi, agreed
with the court's opinion except for the holding that public entities,
such as NJT, may be liable for punitive damages under LAD. See id at
135, 735 A.2d at 564 (Pollock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Pollock noted that the New Jersey Tort Claims Act
(TCA) expressly forbids the imposition of punitive damages against
public entities. See id. In addition, the justice asserted that the
language of LAD does not provide an exception to the TCA. See id
(citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:9-2 (West 1992)). Therefore, Justice
Pollock concluded that the absence of an exception for
governmental entities suggests that the TCA's ban on punitive
damages would also apply to such entities in suit under LAD. See id
Justice Pollock contended that the court's opinion imposes a
severe burden on citizens of the state by saddling them with the
ultimate responsibility for paying punitive damage awards. See id., 735
A.2d at 564-65 (Pollock,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Specifically, the justice was concerned that the majority's opinion
would ultimately impose upon NJT's commuters the duty to bear the
cost of the punitive damage award. See id. Believing that a ban on
punitive damage awards against public entities is more consistent with
the legislative intent, Justice Pollock declared that the most desirable
solution would be to allow the New Jersey Legislature to revisit and
resolve this issue. See id. at 136, 735 A.2d at 565 (Pollock, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted a strong and
practical definition of "upper management" for the purpose of
imposing punitive damages upon a defendant employer. By focusing
on an employee's functional assignment, the court's definition of
"upper management" ensures that an employer will not be allowed to
insulate itself from liability by giving an employee a nonmanagerial
title and then entrusting that employee with important policy
decisions. Moreover, with its clear guidance for identifying "upper
management," the court has guaranteed that the standard will be
applicable to any organization's employment structure.
The holding that a public entity may be liable for punitive
damages under LAD, however, ultimately may not further the goal of
combating discriminatory conduct in the workplace. By allowing a
public entity, such as NJT, to be liable for punitive damages, the court
failed to acknowledge that the remedial purpose of a punitive
damage award is to punish the wrongdoer. In the case of a
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governmental entity, Justice Pollock is correct in recognizing that the
majority's position ultimately punishes the taxpayers of the state, not
the offending public organization. See id, at 135, 735 A.2d at 564-65
(Pollock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). On remand,
if Finn or Smith are found to be members of NJT's "upper
management," NJT may be liable for punitive damages. Such an
award, however, is unlikely to deter NJT from discriminating against
its employees because the citizens of New Jersey, not NJT, will bear
the burden of paying the punitive damage award. Therefore, in this
respect, Cavuoti will have no effect on the elimination of public
workplace discrimination.
Monica Mardikian

CRIMINAL LAW PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT A TRIAL
COURT'S FAILURE TO TAKE SUFFICIENT CURATIVE ACTIONS IN
RESPONSE TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DEPRIVES A DEFENDANT

OFTHE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL - State v. Frost, 158

NJ. 76, 727 A.2d 1

(1999).
On November 16, 1995, Barry and Albert Frost (Cousins) were
arrested during an undercover narcotics investigation conducted by
the Newark Police Department. See State v. Frost, 158 NJ. 76, 78, 727
A.2d 1, 2 (1999).
The Cousins subsequently were indicted for
conspiracy and nine other drug-related offenses. See id. at 78-79, 727
A.2d at 2. At trial, the prosecution and defense offered conflicting
accounts of the events preceding the Cousins' arrests.
The prosecutor's account of the events indicated that an
undercover detective from the Newark Police Department observed a
man purchase drugs outside of Albert Frost's apartment. The
undercover detective then purchased a small amount of a substance,
suspected to be cocaine, from Barry Frost. The detective later visited
the apartment and arrested Barry Frost, who shouted a warning to
Albert Frost. Newark police officers then arrested Albert Frost in the
apartment's bathroom as he was attempting to flush unidentified
substances down the toilet. The police recovered more than twenty
packets of cocaine, thirty-one bags of marijuana, $225 in cash, and
the two marked bills that the detective had given to Barry, commonly
known as "buy money." See id. at 79-80, 727 A.2d at 2.
At trial, the defense's version of the facts indicated that the
Cousins were in Albert Frost's apartment when a man outside of the
building called up to the window. Barry Frost twice went outside to
talk to this man. See id. at 80, 727 A.2d at 2-3. Shoirtly thereafter, the
Cousins heard noises at the apartment door, and, within seconds,
police officers broke through the door and arrested them. See id.,
727 A.2d at 3.
Given these conflicting factual accounts, defense counsel
questioned the police officers' credibility during closing arguments.
Defense
counsel specifically suggested
that the officers'
characterization of the exchange between Barry Frost and the man
standing outside of Albert Frost's apartment as a drug transaction was
illogical. Furthermore, defense counsel noted that the state did not
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produce the "buy money" that the undercover detective claimed was
confiscated from the apartment.
The prosecutor attempted to rebut these claims during the
state's summation. The prosecutor told the jury that the state was not
allowed to produce the "buy money" at trial because the money had
been confiscated. See id. at 81, 727 A.2d at 3. The prosecutor next
attempted to repair the officers' credibility by arguing that there was
no evidence of police misconduct and further suggesting that an
officer would face serious charges for violating proper police
procedure. In addition, the prosecutor advised the jurors to ignore
defense counsel's arguments as mere "lawyer talk." See id. at 81, 727
A.2d at 3. The prosecutor specifically commented "that defense
counsel is banking on maybe one of you got a ticket last week and you
got a bad taste in your mouth towards officers."
The trial court sustained only two of defense counsel's many
objections to the prosecutor's comments and did not strike any of the
comments from the record. As a curative measure, the trial court
instructed the jurors to disregard the prosecutor's comments with
respect to any evidence that conflicted with their own recollections of
the same evidence. See id. at 82, 727 A.2d at 3. The jury found the
Cousins guilty on nine of the ten charges, including the conspiracy
charge.
The Cousins appealed, arguing that the prosecutor's summation
rendered the trial verdict unfair. See id., 727 A.2d at 4. The New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, acknowledged that the
prosecutor's comments were improper, but determined that the trial
was not unfair given the overwhelming evidence against the Cousins.
See id. at 78, 727 A.2d at 2. In an effort to discourage similar future
misconduct of prosecutors, the appellate division referred the matter
to the Attorney General for further review. See id. at 82, 727 A.2d at 4.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to
determine whether the Cousins were deprived of a fair trial due to
the prosecutor's inappropriate comments during summation. See id.
at 78, 82, 727 A.2d at 2, 4. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice
Coleman began the analysis by exploring the role of prosecutors in
criminal trials. See id. at 82, 727 A. 2d at 4. While acknowledging that
a prosecutor is expected to deliver a vigorous, and forceful
summation, the court stressed that a prosecutor's main objective is to
achieve justice. See id. at 82-83, 727 A.2d at 4. Justice Coleman
maintained that a prosecutor must not employ improper methods in
pursuit of convictions because egregious prosecutor misconduct will
result in a reversal of the conviction when the defendant is deprived
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of a fair trial. See id. at 83, 727 A.2d at 4.
In assessing whether a prosecutor's behavior is sufficiently
egregious to warrant a reversal, Justice Coleman explained that a
reviewing court "'must take into account the tenor of the trial and
the degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to
improprieties when they occurred.'" Id. at 83, 727 A.2d at 4 (quoting
State v. Marshall, 123 NJ. 1, 153, 586 A.2d 85, 165 (1991)).
Specifically, the justice announced that a reviewing court must assess
"(1) whether defense counsel made timely and proper objections to
the improper remarks; (2) whether the remarks were withdrawn
promptly; and (3) whether the court ordered the remarks stricken
from the record and instructed the jury to disregard them." Id. The
court stressed that timely objections to improper comments are
necessary because they give the trial court an opportunity to take
curative measures and additionally indicate that defense counsel
found the comments to be prejudicial at the time they were made.
See id. at 84, 727 A.2d at 4.
In applying these standards to the Cousins' case, the court
determined that the prosecutor's conduct was both improper and
harmful. See id. at 84, 727 A.2d at 5. Justice Coleman opined that a
prosecutor is forbidden to make inaccurate factual or legal assertions
and is allowed only to comment on facts brought to light at trial and
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. See id. at 84-85, 727
A.2d at 5. The court found that the remarks concerning the "buy
money" were a blatant misstatement of the law and, therefore, were
highly inappropriate. See id. The justice determined that no legal
obstacle prevented the state from introducing the marked bills into
evidence and, consequently, deemed the prosecutor's remarks
inaccurate and misleading. See id. at 85, 727 A.2d at 5. The court also
stressed that the prosecutor's suggestion that a police officer would
be placing his career in jeopardy by lying was wholly inappropriate
and further noted that such speculation diverts the jurors' attention
from the true issues of the case. See id. at 85-86, 727 A.2d at 5-6.
Furthermore,
the court declared
that the
prosecutor's
characterization of statements made by the defense attorney as
"lawyer talk" was inappropriate. See id.
Based on defense counsel's objections to these improper
remarks, Justice Coleman found that the trial court's curative actions
were inadequate. See id. The justice indicated that the general
charge to the jury was insufficient to combat the prejudicial effect of
the prosecutor's numerous improprieties. See id at 86, 727 A.2d at 6.
The court stressed that the trial hinged on the credibility of the
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witnesses, which inevitably forced the jurors to choose which of the
conflicting versions of the facts they believed. See id. at 87, 727 A.2d
at 6. The court held that the prosecutor's inappropriate comments
maligned the defense's account of the facts, interfered with the
jurors' evaluation of the credibility of the testimony, and may have
led to an unjust result. See id. at 87, 88-89, 727 A.2d at 6, 7.
Therefore, the court disagreed with the appellate division's
conclusion that, because of the overwhelming evidence of the
Cousins' guilt, a reversal was unnecessary. See id. at 87, 727 A.2d at 6.
The court warned that overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt
is never sufficient to displace a defendant's constitutional right to a
fair trial. See id. As a result, the court reversed the Cousins'
convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial. See id. at 89,
727 A.2d at 7.
The court, however, refused to adopt a per se rule that would
require a reversal of all convictions tainted by egregious prosecutorial
misconduct. See id. at 88, 727 A.2d at 7. After noting the deterrent
effect that such a rule would have on future prosecutor misconduct,
the court expressed reservations about reversing a conviction when
there is no clear prejudice to the defendant. See id. The court
stressed that a prosecutor's duty to effectively represent the state,
confine conduct to the rules of professional responsibility, and be
cognizant of the threat of ethical proceedings are more effective
methods of curbing misconduct than is an automatic reversal rule.
See id. In this case, the court opted not to pursue further disciplinary
action, finding the letter of reprimand the prosecutor received from
the Attorney General to be a sufficient deterrent to future
misconduct. See id. at 89, 727 A.2d at 7.
At first glance, the court's opinion appears merely to remind
each actor in a criminal trial to tailor his conduct to the requirements
of the law. The court urged defense attorneys to vigorously defend
their clients and promptly object to inappropriate prosecutorial
comments. The directive that trial judges must provide curative
measures in sustaining the objections - striking inappropriate
comments, and offering the jury an adequate instruction to combat
any prejudicial effect a prosecutor's remarks may have created - are
also instructive. Most significantly, the court implores prosecutors to
act as officers of the court, strive for justice rather than convictions,
and uphold their duties in the administration of the criminal justice
system. The court explains that each actor contributes to an internal
series of checks and balances that, in turn, protects a defendant's
right to a fair trial.
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The opinion also illustrates, however, that another set of checks
and balances is equally important. By choosing not to adopt a per se
reversal rule, the court delicately implies that New Jersey's ethics'
committees, rules of professional responsibility, and the Attorney
General's supervisory powers are better equipped than the courts for
policing egregious prosecutorial misconduct. The court's opinion
demonstrates its confidence in these established policing systems
employed, as alternatives to a per se rule, within New Jersey. It
remains to be seen whether confidence in these systems will have a
negative effect on the administration of justice and, thus, weaken a
defendant's right to a fair trial.
Linda A. MeUina

